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DOES THE IRS PAY ATTENTION TO CASH TAX AVOIDANCE? 
Abstract: The extant literature documents an insignificant association between cash tax avoidance 
and IRS enforcement as proxied by the frequency of the IRS’s downloads of annual reports. This 
result is puzzling given the IRS’s interest in curbing tax avoidance and several stakeholders’ 
perception of cash tax avoidance garnering undesirable IRS scrutiny. To shed light on this puzzle, 
we posit that the IRS focuses its enforcement efforts on only the cash tax-avoiding firms that are 
likely to yield favorable enforcement outcomes to the IRS such as levied interests and penalties. 
Consistent with this view, we provide evidence of a significant positive association between cash 
tax avoidance and the IRS's acquisitions of the 10-Ks hosted on EDGAR when firms are profitable 
both in the current year and in the past. We further document a more pronounced effect for large 
firms and firms with foreign operations. In addition, using IRS budgets as an instrument for IRS 
attention, we find that the firms that are the subject of incremental IRS attention (i.e., consistently 
profitable and large) have greater future cash tax payments. Overall, our findings support 
substantial IRS scrutiny of the financial statements of cash tax-avoiding firms when the firms will 
likely pay back taxes, interest, and penalties to the IRS. Our evidence speaks to the seemingly lax 
IRS enforcement espoused by the media and civil society organizations and suggests a rather more 
efficient enforcement process underlies this perceived laxity. 
 
Keywords: tax enforcement; IRS attention; cash tax avoidance. 
 
Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text. 
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DOES THE IRS PAY ATTENTION TO CASH TAX AVOIDANCE? 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This study examines the circumstances under which firms’ cash tax avoidance activities 
influence the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) scrutiny of firms’ financial statements. Using the 
IRS’ download frequency of annual reports (hereafter, IRS attention) as a proxy for IRS scrutiny, 
Bozanic et al. (2017) document that the IRS does not heavily scrutinize firms with greater cash tax 
avoidance. On the one hand, this result is consistent with the Guenther et al. (2017) finding of 
lower future level and volatility of tax rates for firms with low cash ETRs. That is, on average, the 
tax positions generating low cash ETRs likely are not subsequently overturned upon IRS audit, 
suggesting that the IRS should not be concerned about such firms.  
On the other hand, the result is puzzling for three main reasons. First, intuitively, the IRS 
cares significantly about curbing tax avoidance. Second, higher IRS audit probabilities are 
associated with reduced cash tax avoidance, implying managers’ belief that cash tax avoidance 
will garner IRS scrutiny (Hoopes et al. 2012). Third, several stakeholders perceive lower cash 
ETRs to be risky in that the associated tax positions will likely be overturned upon IRS audit, 
resulting in future cash outlays. For example, low cash ETR associates positively with borrowing 
costs (Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang 2014) and audit fees (Donohoe and Knechel 2013), suggesting 
that lenders and auditors perceive low cash ETRs to be risky. Thus, it is puzzling that the IRS does 
not seem to pay attention to firms with low cash ETRs. 
To shed light on this puzzle, we posit that the IRS chooses to scrutinize only cash tax-
avoiding firms that will likely be able to pay any resulting fines, penalties, interests, or settlements 
without suffering undue financial hardship that might result in bankruptcy. Hence, we suggest the 
IRS focuses on highly profitable and large cash tax-avoiding firms. We also posit that the IRS pays 
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greater attention when the cash tax-avoiding firms have likely engaged in tax planning strategies 
that unduly lower U.S. tax revenues. As such, we expect higher IRS attention on cash tax-avoiding 
firms with foreign operations, who are likely to shift U.S. taxable income to lower foreign tax 
jurisdictions.  
Consistent with Bozanic et al. (2017), we use the number of IRS downloads of U.S. firms’ 
10-Ks (i.e., IRS attention) as our measure of regulatory scrutiny. Using a sample of firm-years 
from 2007–2014, we first validate our sample by examining whether the inferences in Bozanic et 
al. (2017) continue to hold. Consistent with Bozanic et al. (2017), we document an insignificant 
effect of cash ETR on IRS attention, suggesting the IRS does not pay significant attention to firms 
engaging in cash tax avoidance. We then investigate whether firms’ cash tax avoidance elicits IRS 
attention when firms are highly profitable. We find a positive association between cash tax 
avoidance and the frequency of IRS annual reports downloads only for firms with positive pretax 
income in both years t and t-1 or in all three years t, t-1, and t-2. This result is consistent with 
profitable firms with higher levels of cash tax avoidance receiving greater scrutiny from the IRS 
due to IRS enforcement activities. The result could suggest that for profitable firms, low cash ETRs 
correlate with the IRS’s private information or beliefs regarding the firms’ tax avoidance activities 
(Bozanic et al. 2017). The results are also consistent with the IRS focusing on the firms that are 
likely to yield favorable enforcement outcomes.  
Next, we explore the idea that the IRS has scarce resources and as such allocates these 
resources to firms with better enforcement prospects. To this end, we assess whether large cash 
tax-avoiding firms and those with foreign operations elicit greater IRS attention. We find a greater 
positive association between cash tax avoidance and IRS attention for large relative to small 
profitable firms and for profitable firms with foreign pre-tax income relative to profitable firms 
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without foreign pre-tax income. This result is consistent with the IRS more heavily focusing its 
enforcement activities on firms which are more likely to yield favorable enforcement outcomes 
for the IRS. We conduct several robustness tests. First, we document that our results are robust to 
measuring cash tax avoidance using cash taxes paid divided by total assets rather than by adjusted 
pre-tax income. The results are also robust to industry adjusting cash ETR. Second, our results are 
robust to alternative proxies for IRS attention, large firms and to alternative measures of firms’ 
income shifting opportunities. 
We next assess whether IRS attention matters more for firms that are greater IRS 
enforcement targets. To this end, we examine whether firms with greater IRS attention increase 
their cash tax payments in future periods particularly when they are consistently profitable, large, 
and multinational. Drawing casual inference with this analysis suffers from the endogenous 
relationship between IRS attention and cash tax avoidance. We use instrumental variable 
regressions, with IRS budgets as an instrument, to generate “quasi-experimental variation” in IRS 
attention (Angrist and Pischke [2008, p. 122]). As it is difficult to envision any individual firms’ 
cash tax avoidance driving IRS budgets, we argue that IRS budgets provide a plausible source of 
exogenous variation in IRS attention on individual firms.  Consistent with Hoopes et al. (2012), 
we find that IRS attention is positively associated with future cash ETR. Extending this analysis, 
we find a more positive association between current IRS attention and future cash ETR for 
consistently profitable firms (in recent two or three years) relative to firms that are not consistently 
profitable. Focusing on the consistently profitable firms, we further find that current IRS attention 
more positively relates to future cash ETR for large relative to small firms. We do not find a 
differential effect based on the extent of foreign operations. These results suggest that in general, 
 5 
 
the firms the IRS targets for enforcement (i.e., consistently profitable and large), respond to the 
associated increased IRS scrutiny by decreasing cash tax avoidance in the future. 
We contribute evidence on the relationship between cash tax avoidance and IRS scrutiny, 
which is informative to several parties. It is informative to the ongoing debate about the rigor of 
IRS enforcement, especially amidst considerable IRS budget cuts (e.g., Kocieniewski 2010). We 
provide evidence of the IRS’s efficiency by documenting that the IRS selectively scrutinizes the 
firms that are most likely to yield more favorable enforcement outcomes from the perspective of 
the IRS, and that these firms subsequently increase their cash tax payments. Our evidence speaks 
to the seemingly lax IRS enforcement espoused by the media and civil society organizations and 
suggests a rather more efficient enforcement process underlies this perceived laxity.  The evidence 
is also informative to investors, the board of directors, managers, and researchers about when cash 
tax avoidance garners IRS scrutiny.   
We contribute to the literature examining the costs of tax avoidance (Hanlon and Heitzman 
2010). Hoopes et al. (2012) provide evidence of decreased cash tax avoidance for firms with high 
IRS audit probabilities, suggesting that managers perceive IRS audits to be a cost of cash tax 
avoidance. Our results contribute to this literature by providing evidence that lower cash effective 
tax rates result in increased IRS attention when firms are profitable, large, and have foreign 
operations, which can result in signiﬁcant costs in the form of interest and penalties. Corroborating 
the significant costs, we further document increased future cash tax payments for the targeted firms 
Our results also extend the Bozanic et al. (2017) finding of no significant association between cash 
effective tax rates and IRS attention. When we condition this association on firms' profitability, 
we document the expected significant association. Our results highlight that the IRS only 
scrutinizes these cash tax-avoiding firms when the firms are profitable both in the present and in 
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the past. Our results also answer the call to add to the scarce empirical evidence on the association 
between IRS enforcement and corporate tax avoidance (Cowell 2004; Kopczuk and Slemrod 2006; 
Hoopes et al. 2012). 
We also extend the literature examining the association between regulatory scrutiny and a 
variety of corporate outcomes (e.g., Mills 1998; Guedhami, and Pittman 2008; El Ghoul, 
Guedhami, and Pittman 2011; Hanlon, Hoope, and Shroff 2014; Kubick et al. 2016; and Towery 
2017). Mills (1998) find that proposed IRS audit adjustments are increasing in book-tax 
differences while Guedhami and Pittman (2008) and El Ghoul, Guedhami, and Pittman (2011) 
provide evidence consistent with IRS monitoring decreasing equity and debt financing costs.  Our 
results contribute to this literature by providing evidence that for firms that will likely pay back 
taxes, interests, and penalties to the IRS upon audit, lower cash effective tax rates elicit increased 
IRS scrutiny, which is successful in extracting greater future cash tax payments. 
 
2. LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES  
2.1. The Costs of Cash Tax Avoidance 
The extant literature examines the costs of cash tax avoidance from a variety of 
perspectives. Some evidence suggests cash tax avoidance is not costly (Guenther et al. 2017; Chen, 
Schuchard and Stomberg 2018), whereas others find negative implications of cash tax avoidance 
(Hoopes, Mescall, and Pittman 2012; Donohoe and Knechel 2014; Hasan et al. 2014; Isin 2018; 
Chen, Schuchard and Stomberg 2018).  Guenther et al. (2017) find that cash tax avoidance is 
associated with greater future cash tax avoidance, lower volatility in future tax payments relative 
to pretax income, and lower future stock return volatility. One implication of these results is that 
on average, cash tax avoidance is not risky in that the associated tax positions are not later 
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overturned resulting in increased future tax payments. Chen, Schuchard and Stomberg (2018) 
provide evidence that cash taxes do no subsequently decrease after media coverage of corporate 
taxes. These results suggest that cash tax avoidance should not garner IRS scrutiny. 
In contrast, another body of work suggests IRS attention should be increasing in cash tax 
avoidance. Hoopes, Mescall, and Pittman (2012) find that firms with high IRS audit probabilities 
engage in less cash tax avoidance. Donohoe and Knechel (2014) proxy for tax aggressiveness that 
is “likely of interest to tax authorities” using very low cash and current ETRs and posit that the 
auditor’s risk assessment is increasing in tax aggressiveness. Accordingly, they find a positive 
association between tax aggressiveness and audit fees. Also, Hasan et al. (2014) and Isin (2018) 
document that cash tax avoidance is positively associated with abnormal loan interest payments. 
They interpret the results as lenders perceive that cash tax avoidance induces significant risks and 
thus lenders penalize firms with greater cash tax avoidance with higher loan costs. Chen, 
Schuchard, and Stomberg (2018) find that firms with high cash tax avoidance elicit a more negative 
toned-media coverage. Together, these studies suggest that managers, auditors, lenders, and the 
media perceive that cash tax avoidance will likely induce IRS scrutiny. 
2.2. IRS Enforcement and Cash Tax Avoidance 
An emerging literature examines the relation between IRS enforcement and corporate tax 
avoidance, although empirical evidence on this issue remains scarce (Cowell 2004; Kopczuk and 
Slemrod 2006; Hoopes et al. 2012).  This literature generally suggests that cash tax avoidance 
elicits IRS scrutiny.  Mills (1998) finds that proposed IRS audit adjustments are increasing in book-
tax differences. Hoopes, Mescall, and Pittman (2012) document that the manager's perception of 
higher IRS enforcement as measured with IRS audit probabilities is associated with lower cash tax 
avoidance. Finley (2019) develop a measure of managers’ perception of lax IRS monitoring using 
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unrecognized tax benefit settlements and provide evidence of increased cash tax avoidance for 
firms perceiving lax IRS monitoring.  
Given this wealth of evidence suggesting a positive association between cash tax avoidance 
and IRS enforcement, it is puzzling that Bonzanic et al. (2017) do not provide evidence consistent 
with this suggestion.  Instead, they find no significant association between cash tax avoidance and 
IRS attention, although they document a positive association between UTB and IRS attention.  The 
purpose of this study is to examine this puzzle by considering the circumstances under which cash 
tax avoidance might garner IRS attention. We posit that the IRS focuses its enforcement efforts on 
only the cash tax-avoiding firms that are likely to yield favorable enforcement outcomes to the IRS 
such as levied interests and penalties. We identify firm profitability, size, and foreign operations 
as firm characteristics describing firms with the potential to yield better IRS enforcement 
outcomes.  
2.3. IRS Enforcement, Cash Tax Avoidance, and Firm Profitability (H1) 
Firms that are profitable in the present and past likely can generate funds to pay back taxes 
owed, interests, and penalties without going bankrupt and should thus generate future taxable 
income which is beneficial to the IRS. IRS focus on such firms likely yields better enforcement 
success. Consistent with this intuition, prior research finds a positive association between firm 
profitability and IRS scrutiny (Bonzanic et al. 2017). Moreover, the likelihood of being audited by 
the IRS is increasing in firm profitability (Nessa, Schwab, Stomberg 2019). 
Given that firms with low cash taxes paid have likely undertaken positions that will be 
overturned upon IRS audit (e.g., Donohoe and Knechel 2014) and the greater opportunities to 
generate tax revenues in the present and future from profitable firms, we expect the IRS to increase 
enforcement efforts on profitable cash tax-avoiding firms. Hence, we hypothesize: 
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H1: Cash tax avoidance is more positively associated with IRS attention when firms are profitable. 
 
 
2.4. IRS Enforcement, Cash Tax Avoidance, and Firm Size (H2) 
Resources to pay and the opportunity to collect greater amounts are increasing in firm size. 
As the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), a nonpartisan research group 
affiliated with Syracuse University succinctly stated, the “the larger the business, the larger the 
dollar amounts of tax underreporting and back taxes on average that they may owe” (Kocieniewski 
2010).  Although a 2010 TRAC study suggests reduced IRS attention on large firms (Kocieniewski 
2010), the extant empirical research suggests IRS scrutiny is increasing in firm size (Bonzanic et 
al. 2017). Moreover, the likelihood of being audited by the IRS is increasing in firm size (Nessa, 
Schwab, Stomberg 2019).  
Given the anecdotal and empirical evidence that the IRS will collect more in back taxes, 
interests, and penalties form large firms and the literature noting increased IRS scrutiny of large 
firms, we predict that the IRS pays more attention to large cash tax-avoiding firms. Accordingly, 
we hypothesize: 
H2: Cash tax avoidance is more positively associated with IRS attention when firms are large. 
 
 
2.5. IRS Enforcement, Cash Tax Avoidance, and Foreign Operations (H3) 
Foreign operations present opportunities for income shifting and questionable tax practices 
which while lowering cash taxes, increases the probability of being overturned by the IRS (De 
Simone, Mills, Stomberg 2018). As such, the IRS recently increased its efforts to improve global 
tax enforcement as evidenced by the renaming of the Large and Mid-Size Business (LMSB) 
division as the Large Business and International division (LB&I) in 2010 (IRS 2010). Accordingly, 
 10 
 
prior research documents that firms with foreign operations face greater IRS scrutiny (Bonzanic 
et al. 2017). Also, firms with foreign operations are more likely to be audited by the IRS (Nessa, 
Schwab, Stomberg 2019). In addition, measuring complexity to include foreign sales, Ayers, 
Seidman, and Towery (2019) document that complexity is positively associated with the likelihood 
of being audited by the IRS in the CIC program. 
Foreign operations, together with lower cash taxes, suggest firms' use of tax strategies that 
are likely to be overturned upon IRS audit. Thus, we expect the IRS to increase scrutiny on cash 
tax-avoiding firms with foreign operations. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H3: Cash tax avoidance is more positively associated with IRS attention when firms have foreign 
operations. 
 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Sample  
Table 1 illustrates our sample selection procedure. Our primary sample consists of all firms 
from the Compustat database. The sample period is from 2004 to 2014.1 We exclude foreign firms, 
firms in the financial sector (SIC codes 6000 – 6999) and the utility sector (SIC codes 4900 – 
4949), and firms with $0 or less in book assets. We also require observations with the necessary 
data to compute the variables in our model. We merge this data from Compustat with the IRS 
attention data from Bozanic et al. (2017).2 We restrict the sample from 2007 to 2014 to control for 
UTB. Our final sample used in the multivariate regression analyses consists of 12,446 firm-year 
observations for the 2007 - 2014 period.3  
                                                          
1We run regressions from 2007 to 2014 because UTB is only available from 2007. We started from 2004 because we 
need the prior three years to calculate pretax income in year t-1 and year t-2.  
2 Accessed at http://jeffreyhoopes.com/data/irsattentiondata.html.     
3The sample size is very close to the sample size in Bozanic et al. (2017), which is 12,191. 
 11 
 
<< Insert Table 1 here >> 
 
3.2. Empirical Design 
We first validate our sample by replicating the Table 2 results in Bozanic et al. (2017). 
Following Bozanic et al. (2017), we estimate the following OLS specification (firm and year 
subscripts are omitted for brevity):  
IRSATTENTION = β0 + β1 CASHETR+ βn CONTROLS+ FIXEDEFFECTS+ ε  (1) 
 
Following Bozanic et al. (2017), we measure IRSATTENTION using the number of times 
during a year that an individual with an IRS IP address downloaded a firm’s 10-K from EDGAR. 
Thus, IRSATTENTION captures the frequency that the IRS uses a firm's financial information. A 
larger value of IRSATTENTION suggests the IRS pays more attention to the firm. Bozanic et al. 
(2017) verify this measure in several ways. They find that the relative frequency of IRS downloads 
of firms by asset size is similar to IRS audits disclosed by the IRS. Also, both within-day and 
within-week download patterns, suggested by this measure, are consistent with the government 
employees' work schedule. For example, the number of downloads decreased dramatically during 
the federal government shutdown between October 1 and 16 in 2013. This measure has been used 
frequently in recent studies (e.g., Fox and Wilson 2019; Finley and Stekelberg 2019). To address 
the skewness in the measure, we use the natural logarithm of the number of downloads. 
Consistent with Bozanic et al. (2017), we measure CASHETR by dividing taxes paid 
(TXPD) by pretax book income net of special items (PI-SPI)4. We focus on CASHETR because 
the IRS’s primary responsibility is collecting cash taxes. To test our first hypothesis that cash tax 
                                                          
4 Following Bozanic et al. (2017), CASHETR is the within-sample quintile rank of CASHETR. 
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avoidance is more positively associated with IRS attention when firms are profitable, we estimate 
model (1) in two subsamples: one with firms that are profitable in the current year and the previous 
year (PROFIT1=1; i.e., both PIt and PIt-1 are greater than zero) and the other remaining firms 
(PROFIT1=0). We compare the difference in β1 between these two subsamples to test H1. We also 
compare the difference in β1 between PROFIT2=1 (i.e., PIt, PIt-1, and PIt-2 are greater than zero) 
and the other remaining firms (PROFIT2=0).  A larger β1 when PROFIT1 (PROFIT2) =1 relative 
to when PROFIT1 (PROFIT2) =0 suggests the IRS pays more attention to cash tax avoiding firms 
when the firms are profitable compared to when the firms are not profitable.  
To test hypothesis 2, we run regressions on samples split by firm size and compare β1 
between the subsamples. Specifically, we estimate model (1) in two subsamples: one with larger 
firms (BIGFIRM=1; i.e., SIZE greater than the median in the sample) and the other with smaller 
firms (BIGFIRM=0). We compare the difference in β1 between these two subsamples to test H2. 
A larger β1 when BIGFIRM =1 relative to when BIGFIRM =0 suggests the IRS pays more attention 
to cash tax avoiding firms when the firms are larger compared to when the firms are smaller.  
Similarly, to test hypothesis 3, we run regressions on samples split by the level of foreign 
operations and compare β1 between the subsamples. We estimate model (1) in two subsamples: 
one for firms with more foreign operations (MNE=1; i.e., firms with overseas operations) and the 
other remaining firms (MNE=0). We compare the difference in β1 between these two subsamples 
to test H3. A larger β1 when MNE=1 relative to when MNE =0 suggests the IRS pays more attention 
to cash tax avoiding firms when the firms have more foreign operations compared to when the 
firms have less foreign.  
All regression models include industry (two-digit SIC), firm, and fiscal year fixed effects 
to control for unobserved differences within the industry, firm, and year. We cluster standard errors 
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by firm (Cameron and Miller 2015; Gow et al. 2011) and to control for outliers, we winsorize all 
continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
Following Bozanic et al. (2017), we use GAAPETR, BTD, UTB, DTA, and DTL to control 
for the level of tax avoidance. We control for numerous firm and reporting characteristics that 
could affect IRS attention. We control for SIZE, defined as the natural logarithm of the market 
value of equity, and expect that larger firms have more tax planning opportunities (Siegfried 1974) 
and IRS would pay more attention to them ( Hoopes et al. 2012; Ayers et al. 2019). Lagged market-
to-book ratio (MTB) represents growing firms' preference for tax-favored investments, which 
could potentially attract IRS’ attention. We include complexity (MNE), which equals one if firms 
have any pretax income from foreign operations, and zero otherwise.  Firms with operations in 
multiple jurisdictions could have more tax planning opportunities and tax compliance requirements 
(Rego 2003), and the IRS could pay more attention to them. We include leverage (LEV), measured 
by long-term debt divided by lagged total assets, because Stickney and McGee (1982) suggest that 
highly leveraged firms tend to avoid more tax, potentially affecting the IRS’ attention. Following 
Bozanic et al. (2017), we also include R&D expenses (R&D), inventory intensity (INVT), capital 
intensity (CAPITAL), sales growth (%ΔREV), and intangible assets (INTAN). We also include 
return on assets (ROA) because Gupta and Newberry (1997) suggest that profitability affects tax 
outcomes. We control for the effect of tax loss attributes on IRS attention by including the change 
in net operating losses (ΔNOL). The prior literature finds an association between tax outcomes and 
cash holdings (Dhaliwal, Huang, Moser, and Pereira 2011). Therefore, we include free cash flow 
(CASH) to control for its potential effect on IRS attention. We provide detailed definitions of all 
variables in Appendix A.  
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4. RESULTS 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for each variable used in the empirical analyses. 
Consistent with Bozanic et al. (2017), on average, the number of times the IRS downloaded a 
firm's 10-K during a given year is about 9, and the median is 3. All other variables' distributions 
are also very close to the distribution in Bozanic et al. (2017). 
<< Insert Table 2 here >> 
We draw a figure to obtain a pictorial view of how firms’ cash effective tax rates change 
after increases in IRS attention. We define high (low) IRS attention firms as those with above 
(below) median of the number of 10-K downloads by the IRS in fiscal year 2010 which we 
consider the treatment year. We ensure that high IRS attention firms are low IRS attention firms 
in periods 2007, 2008, and 2009 and the low IRS attention firms are classified as such throughout 
periods 2007 to 2013. We then plot CETRs for the high and low IRS attention firms over years 
2007 to 2013. We expect that before firms become high IRS attention firms, their CETRs are lower 
than those of low IRS attention firms, but the CETRs should increase after the IRS increases its 
attention on their annual reports.  
Results in Figure 1 suggest that, before firms become high IRS attention firms, their CETRs 
are lower than those of low IRS attention firms. However, when IRS attention increases for these 
firms, they bear a cost in terms of increased cash tax payments relative to firms with low IRS 
attention. Subsequently, these firms’ cash tax payment pattern merges with that of the low IRS 
attention firms.    
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4.2. Replicating the Results in Bozanic et al. (2017) 
We start by replicating the results in Table 2 of Bozanic et al. (2017). Following Bozanic 
et al. (2017), we use four different models to examine the effects of different tax avoidance 
measures on IRS attention. Beyond that, we add one more regression which controls for all 
industry, firm, and year fixed effects. 
Table 3 presents the results. With only firm and year fixed effects, the R2 of the regression 
in column 1 is 0.650. This suggests that about 65% of the variation in IRS attention is caused by 
fixed effects, which is close to the 0.64 in Bozanic et al. (2017). In the regressions in columns 2 
and 3, we observe significant coefficients on GAAPETR, UTB, and DTA (significant in column 3), 
which is similar to the results in Bozanic et al. (2017). After adding firm fixed effects in column 
4, the coefficient on GAAPETR becomes insignificant. More importantly, the coefficients on 
CASHETR are not significant in all the models. We also add one more regression after controlling 
for industry, firm, and year fixed effects; results are consistent with the results in column 4. While 
we observe a difference in the significance of some coefficients (e.g., DTL and CAPITAL), over all, 
we can replicate the Table 2 results in Bozanic et al. (2017), which documents that the effect of 
CASHETR on IRSATTENTION is not significant after controlling for firm fixed effects.  
<< Insert Table 3 here >> 
 
4.3. Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Results 
Table 4 panel A provides descriptive statistics for firms with positive pretax income in both 
the current and previous year (PROFIT1=1). The sample size reduces from 12,446 to 9,297. On 
average, the number of times the IRS downloaded a firm’s 10-K during a given year increases 
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from 9 in the full sample to 10 and the median is still 3. Overall, the distribution of variables in 
this sample is similar to the larger sample of 12,446 observations. 
We also provide descriptive statistics for the remaining firms in panel B (PROFIT1=0). 
The sample size is 3,149 (12,446 minus 9,297). On average, the number of times the IRS 
downloaded a firm’s 10-K during a given year reduces from 9 in the PROFIT1=1 sample to 6, 
with a median of 2. Notably, the mean value of IRSATTENTION when PROFIT1=1 drops from 10 
to 6 when PROFIT1=0, indicating that the IRS pays more attention to profitable firms. Also, both 
GAAPETR and CASHETR are lower when PROFIT1=0. Finally, we observe that firms are smaller 
and having more growth opportunities when PROFIT1=0. Overall, the distribution of variables in 
the sample with positive pretax income in both the current and previous year is similar to the larger 
sample of 12,446 observations, which is similar to the distribution in the Bozanic et al. (2017).  
<< Insert Table 4 here >> 
 
 We provide Pearson and Spearman correlations among variables in the subsample with 
PROFIT1=1 in table 5. We observe that, among the tax avoidance measures, GAAPETR, BTD, 
UTB, DTA, and DTL are significantly correlated with IRSATTENTION. Consistent with Bozanic 
et al. (2017), CASHETR is not significantly associated with IRSATTENTION.  
<< Insert Table 5 here >> 
 
4.4. Multivariate Results  
4.4.1. IRS Attention, Cash Tax Avoidance, and Firm Profitability (H1) 
To test the first hypothesis, we estimate model (1) in subsamples with PROFIT1=1, 
PROFIT1=0, PROFIT2=1, and PROFIT2=0. We present the results of this test in Table 6, columns 
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1 through 4 respectively. When PROFIT1=1, the coefficient on CASHETR is significantly negative 
(Estimate = –0.010, t stat. = –1.7) but the coefficient is insignificant when PROFIT1=0 (Estimate 
= –0.002, t stat. = –0.1).  Similarly, when PROFIT2=1, the coefficient on CASHETR is 
significantly negative (Estimate = –0.014, t stat. = –2.1) but the coefficient is insignificant when 
PROFIT2=0 (Estimate = 0.001, t stat. = 0.1). While there is no significant association between 
CASHETR and IRSATTENTION on average (per the results in Table 3 and consistent with 
Bonzanic et al. 2017) suggesting cash tax avoidance does not elicit IRS attention, these Table 6 
results paint a different picture. When firms have been profitable in recent years, the firms’ cash 
tax avoidance garners significant IRS attention. Consistent with H1, the coefficient on CASHETR 
is significantly more negative when PROFIT1 (PROFIT2) =1 relative to when PROFIT1 
(PROFIT2) = 0 (t stat. = 2.4 and 5.1). 
When we use greater than zero pretax income in year t to define profitability, only 351 
observations are not profitable compared to the 12,095 profitable firm-year observations. Thus, 
almost all firm-year observations in our sample are profitable in the current period. Moreover, we 
do not find similar evidence as the results presented in Table 6 suggesting that the current year’s 
profitability does not matter for IRS attention by itself. Rather, it is both the current and previous 
years’ profitability of cash tax avoiding firms that draws IRS scrutiny. Overall, these results 
together suggest that, for consistently profitable firms, the IRS increases enforcement efforts on 
the firms exhibiting higher levels of cash tax avoidance. In contrast, IRS enforcement is not 
responsive to cash tax avoidance when firms are not consistently profitable. Moreover, the results 
imply that to collect more tax revenues effectively, the IRS targets those firms with a greater ability 
to pay.  
<< Insert Table 6 here >> 
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4.4.2. IRS Attention, Cash Tax Avoidance, and Firm Size (H2) 
Since we observe the coefficient on CASHETR is only significant within the consistently 
profitable firms, we present our hypotheses 2 and 3 results within this sample only, although our 
untabulated tests within the full sample corroborate these results. To test our second hypothesis, 
we estimate model (1) in subsamples with BIGFIRM =1 and BIGFIRM =0, where BIGFIRM =1 if 
a firm’s market value of equity is above the sample median. We present the results of this test in 
Table 7, with the PROFIT1 =1 (PROFIT2 =1) results in columns 1 and 2 (columns 3 and 4). 
Consistent with H2, the coefficient on CASHETR is significantly more negative when BIGFIRM 
=1 relative to when BIGFIRM =0 (t stat. = 5.0 and 3.7).  
Thus, the results suggest that compared to small cash tax avoiding firms, large cash tax 
avoiding firms are more likely to attract IRS attention. The results are consistent with the IRS 
focusing its enforcement efforts on the firms that both have a higher probability of owing and the 
resources to pay back taxes, interests, and penalties.  
<< Insert Table 7 here >> 
4.4.3. IRS Attention, Cash Tax Avoidance, and Foreign Operations (H3) 
To test hypothesis 3, we estimate model (1) in subsamples with MNE =1 and MNE =0, 
where MNE =1 if a firm’s foreign income (PIFO) is greater than zero. We present the results of 
this test in Table 8, with the PROFIT1 =1 (PROFIT2 =1) results in columns 1 and 2 (columns 3 
and 4). When PROFIT1=1, the coefficient on CASHETR is significantly negative (Estimate = –
0.016, t stat. = –2.0) when MNE =1 but the coefficient is insignificant when MNE =0 (Estimate = 
–0.006, t stat. = –0.7).  Similarly, when PROFIT2=1, the coefficient on CASHETR is significantly 
negative (Estimate = –0.014, t stat. = –2.1) when MNE =1 but the coefficient is insignificant when 
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MNE =0 (Estimate = 0.001, t stat. = 0.1).  Hence, even within the consistently profitable firms, 
cash tax avoiding firms elicit IRS attention only when they have foreign operations.  Consistent 
with H3, the coefficient on CASHETR is significantly more negative when MNE =1 relative to 
when MNE =0 (t stat. = 3.1 and 4.3).  
Overall, the results suggest the IRS is more likely to pay attention to firms with overseas 
operations that pay lower taxes. The results are consistent with the IRS increasing scrutiny of firms 
that have greater opportunities to avoid taxes, especially when the firms exhibit low cash effective 
tax rates. 
<< Insert Table 8 here >> 
 
5. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
5.1. Firms with Frequent IRS Audits 
The IRS has a program called Coordinated Industry Case (CIC) program, which requires 
many of the largest corporate taxpayers in the United States to be under certain audit from the IRS 
(Ayers et al. 2018; Hanlon et al. 2007). This fact could raise the concern that our results are driven 
by the CIC program firms. To address this concern, we re-estimate model (1) in a sample that 
excludes larger firms. Since firms in the CIC program is not publicly known (Hoopes et al. 2012), 
we exclude firms in the top quintile of market value from our sample. From the untabulated results, 
we observe an insignificant difference between the coefficient on CASHETR when PROFIT1 =1 
and when PROFIT1 =0 (t stat. = 0.3). However, we observe a more negative coefficient on 
CASHETR when PROFIT2=1 relative to when PROFIT2 =0 (t stat. = –3.2). Similarly, we find 
consistent evidence as those presented in our tests of H2 (Table 7) and H3 (Table 8). Thus, over 
all, our H1, H2, and H3 results are not driven by those firms in the CIC program. 
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5.2. Alternative Measures of Cash Tax Avoidance 
We assess whether our main results in the previous sections are sensitive to our measure 
of cash tax avoidance. We re-estimate model (1) using two alternative cash ETR measures. First, 
we replace the denominator with total assets (instead of pretax income minus special items in our 
main test). Also, following Balakrishnan et al. (2019), we use industry-year adjusted cash ETR as 
the cash ETR measure. Untabulated results suggest that our main results hold when we use these 
alternative measures. Specifically, when we use cash ETR scaled by total assets, the coefficient on 
CASHETR is marginally more negative when PROFIT1 =1 relative to when PROFIT1 =0 (t stat. = 
–1.6). Similarly, the coefficient on CASHETR is more negative when PROFIT2=1 relative to when 
PROFIT2 =0 (t stat. = –1.9). We also find results consistent with our main results supporting H2 
and H3 when we use cash ETR scaled by total assets to proxy for cash tax avoidance. 
We find similar results when we use industry-year adjusted cash ETR as the alternative 
measure of cash ETR. We observe the coefficient on the adjusted cash ETR is more negative: 
when PROFIT1 =1 relative to when PROFIT1 =0 (t stat. = –1.8) and when PROFIT2 =1 relative 
to when PROFIT2 = 0 (t stat. = –6.0).  The coefficient on the adjusted cash ETR is also more 
negative: when BIGFIRM (MNE) =1 relative to when BIGFIRM (MNE) =0, consistent with H2 
(H3). Thus, our result that the IRS increases enforcement efforts on the firms exhibiting higher 
levels of cash tax avoidance for consistently profitable firms, large firms, and firms with foreign 
operations are robust to different measures of cash tax avoidance. 
5.3. Alternative Measures of IRS Attention 
Our main tests measure IRS attention using the natural logarithm of the number of times during 
a year that an individual with an IRS IP address downloaded a firm’s 10-K from EDGAR. In sensitivity 
analyses, we use the raw count of the number of IRS downloads per year and OLS regressions. Our main 
results hold when we use this alternative measurement. Specifically, for H1, the coefficient on 
 21 
 
CASHETR is more negative when PROFIT1 =1 relative to when PROFIT1 =0 (t stat. = –416.3). 
Similarly, the coefficient on CASHETR is more negative when PROFIT2=1 relative to when 
PROFIT2 =0 (t stat. = –1072.1). For H2, we observe, when PROFIT1 =1, the coefficient on 
CASHETR is more negative when BIGFIRM =1 relative to when BIGFIRM =0 (t stat. = –102.1). 
Similarly, when PROFIT2 =1 the coefficient on CASHETR is more negative when BIGFIRM =1 
relative to when BIGFIRM =0 (t stat. = –93.0). For H3, we find, when PROFIT1 =1, the coefficient 
on CASHETR is more negative when MNE=1 relative to when MNE =0 (t stat. = –2.3).  Finally, 
when PROFIT2 =1, the coefficient on CASHETR is not significantly different when MNE=1 from 
when MNE=0 (t stat. = –1. 1). Thus, overall, our results are consistent with our main results when 
we use this alternative measure to proxy for IRS attention. 
 
5.4. Alternative Measures of Firm Size 
While our main proxy for firm size is based on the market value of equity, we use sales 
and total assets as different measures of firm size to assess the robustness of our H2 results. 
Untabulated results suggest that, in both the PROFIT1 =1 and PROFIT2 =1 sample, with size 
based on total assets, the coefficient on CASHETR is significantly more negative when BIGFIRM 
=1 relative to when BIGFIRM =0 (t stat. = –3.9 and –7.5, respectively). When we use sales as the 
proxy for size, we observe similar results. The coefficient on CASHETR is significantly more 
negative when BIGFIRM =1 relative to when BIGFIRM =0 in both the PROFIT1 =1 and PROFIT2 
=1 samples (t stat. = –2.3 and –5.9, respectively). Thus, our results are not sensitive to alternative 
size measures.  
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5.5. Alternative Measures of Foreign Operations 
To examine whether our results for H3 is sensitive to the foreign operations measure we 
use, we examine an alternative proxy for foreign operations. Specifically, we define MNE1 equals 
one, if foreign pre-tax income is greater than the median of foreign pre-tax income in the sample, 
zero otherwise. We use this measure to reexamine H3. Untabulated results suggest that, within 
both the PROFIT1 =1 and PROFIT2 =1 samples, the coefficient on CASHETR is significantly 
more negative when MNE1 =1 relative to when MNE1 =0 (t stat. = –2.6 and –3.1, respectively). 
In other words, our H3 result is robust to this alternative measure of foreign operations.  
 
6. CONSEQUENCES OF IRS ATTENTION 
 In the previous sections, we document that the IRS pays more attention to firms with lower 
cash ETR when the firms are consistently profitable, large, and have foreign operations. A natural 
question is whether as a consequence to the greater IRS scrutiny, the firms increase their cash tax 
payments in future periods due to decreased cash tax avoidance. Also, whether the IRS is 
successful in recovering back taxes, interest, and penalties from these selectively targeted firms. 
We evaluate these questions by examining  whether firms with greater IRS attention increase their 
cash tax payments in future periods particularly when they are consistently profitable, large, and 
multinational. Drawing casual inference with this analysis suffers from the endogenous 
relationship between IRS attention and cash tax avoidance. We use instrumental variable 
regressions, with IRS budgets as an instrument for IRS attention. We argue that IRS budgets 
provide a plausible source of exogenous variation in IRS attention on individual firms because it 
is difficult to envision any individual firms’ cash tax avoidance being an impetus for IRS budgets.  
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Following Nessa et al. (2019), we measure IRS budget and consequently its resources using 
(1) IRS expenditures scaled by the number of tax returns per year and (2) the number of tax agents 
scaled by the number of tax returns in that year. We define a year to be budget constrained if either 
of the IRS resources measure is below the median for years 2002 to 2016. In the first stage, we use 
the IRS budget constraint measure and all other control variables in the model (1) to predict IRS 
attention. In the second stage, we regress firms’ future cash ETR (CETRt+1) on the predicted value 
of IRS attention (IRSATTENTIONHAT) from the first stage model. Table 9 and 10 report results.  
 The first column in Table 9 presents the results on the full sample of companies. The 
significant and positive coefficient on IRSATTENTIONHAT suggests that firms increase their 
CETRs in the next year after they experience greater IRS attention. This result is consistent with 
Hoopes et al. 2012. To test whether the effect is stronger for consistently profitable firms, we 
compare the coefficients on IRSATTENTIONHAT between PROFIT1=1 and PROFIT1=0 
(PROFIT2=1 and PROFIT2=0), with the results presented in columns 2 and 3 (4 and 5) of Table 
9, respectively. The significant t-stats. presented at the bottom of these columns (t=15.4 and 
t=20.7) suggest that, compared to firms that are not consistently profitable, greater IRS attention 
in the current year increases the proceeding year’s cash ETR to a greater extent for firms that are 
consistently profitable. Focusing on the consistently profitable firms (PROFIT2=1), results 
presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 10, the coefficient of IRSATTENTIONHAT is significantly 
greater for the large firms (BIGFIRM =1) than for the small firms (BIGFIRM =0). The difference 
in this coefficient is not statistically significant for firms with overseas operations (MNE =1) 
relative to those without foreign operations (MNE =0). Untabulated results for PROFIT1=1 are 
consistent with these results. Overall, these results suggest that in general, the firms the IRS targets 
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for enforcement (i.e., consistently profitable and large), respond to the associated increased IRS 
scrutiny by decreasing cash tax avoidance in the future. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 One recent study raises a puzzle that the IRS is not interested in firms’ cash effective tax 
rate, despite the IRS's interest in curbing tax avoidance and several stakeholders' perception of 
cash tax avoidance garnering undesirable IRS scrutiny. To shed light on this puzzle, we posit that 
the IRS focuses its enforcement efforts on only the cash tax-avoiding firms that are likely to yield 
favorable enforcement outcomes to the IRS such as levied interests and penalties. Consistent with 
this view, we provide evidence of a significant positive association between cash tax avoidance 
and the IRS's acquisition of the 10-Ks hosted on EDGAR when firms are profitable both in the 
current year and in the past. We further document a more pronounced effect for large firms and 
firms with foreign operations. Overall, our findings support substantial IRS scrutiny of the 
financial statements of cash tax-avoiding firms when the firms will likely pay interest and penalties 
to the IRS.  In addition, using IRS budgets as an instrument generating plausibly exogenous 
variation in IRS attention, we find that the firms that are the subject of incremental IRS attention 
(i.e., consistently profitable and large) have greater future cash tax payments. 
This study is important to different stakeholders. It is informative to the ongoing debate 
about the rigor of IRS enforcement, especially amidst considerable IRS budget cuts (e.g., 
Kocieniewski 2010). We provide evidence of the IRS's efficiency by documenting that the IRS 
selectively scrutinizes the firms that are most likely to yield more favorable enforcement outcomes 
from the perspective of the IRS. The evidence is also informative to investors, the board of 
directors, managers, and researchers about when cash tax avoidance garners IRS scrutiny. Our 
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evidence speaks to the seemingly lax IRS enforcement espoused by the media and civil society 
organizations and suggests a rather more efficient enforcement process underlies this laxity.    
We contribute to the literature examining the costs of tax avoidance (Hanlon and Heitzman 
2010). Our results contribute to this literature by providing evidence that lower cash effective tax 
rates result in increased IRS attention when firms are profitable, large, and have foreign operations, 
which can result in signiﬁcant costs in the form of interest and penalties. The result also extends 
the Bozanic et al. (2017) finding of no significant association between cash effective tax rates and 
IRS attention. When we condition this association on firms’ profitability, we document the 
expected significant association. Our results highlight that the IRS only scrutinizes these cash tax-
avoiding firms when the firms are profitable both in the present and in the past. Our results also 
answer the call to add to the scarce empirical evidence on the association between IRS enforcement 
and corporate tax avoidance (Cowell 2004; Kopczuk and Slemrod 2006; Hoopes et al. 2012). 
We also extend the literature examining the association between regulatory scrutiny and a 
variety of corporate outcomes. Previous literature provides evidence consistent with IRS 
monitoring, decreasing equity and debt financing costs.  Our results contribute to this literature by 
providing evidence that for firms that will likely pay back taxes, interests, and penalties to the IRS 
upon audit, lower cash effective tax rates elicit increased IRS scrutiny. 
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APPENDIX A 
Variable Definitions 
Main Variables Definition 
IRSATTENTION Following Bozanic et al. (2017), the natural logarithm of the number of 
times during a year that an individual with an IRS IP address downloaded 
a firm’s 10-K from EDGAR. 
GASHETR Taxes paid (TXPD) divided by pretax book income net of 
special items (PI-SPI). 
GAAPETR  Income taxes divided by pretax book income (TXT/(PI-SPT)). 
BTD Pretax income (PI) minus current domestic and foreign tax 
expense (TXFED + TXFO) grossed up by 35%and 
adjusted for the change in NOLs (TLCF), scaled by assets 
(AT). 
UTB Year-end unrecognized tax benefits (UTBs) (TXTUBEND) 
divided by total assets (AT). 
DTA Net deferred tax assets (TXNDBA) scaled by total assets (AT). 
DTL 
Net deferred tax liabilities (TXNDBL) scaled by total assets 
(AT).  
Control Variables 
ROA  Return on assets, computed as pretax book income (Compustat PI) 
divided by lagged total assets (Compustat AT). 
ACC  Performance-matched pre-tax discretionary accruals following Frank et 
al. (2009). 
SIZE  The natural logarithm of the market value of equity (Compustat 
PRCC_F*CSHO). 
MNE Equals one, if firms with any foreign income (i.e., PIFO not missing), 
computed as pretax foreign income (Compustat PIFO) divided by lagged 
total assets (Compustat AT), zero otherwise.  
INTAN  Reported intangibles (Compustat INTAN) divided by lagged total assets 
(Compustat AT). 
CAPITAL  Net property, plant, and equipment (Compustat PPENT) divided by 
lagged total assets (Compustat AT). 
INVT Inventory (INVT) divided by lagged total assets. 
CHANGEINNOL  Change in net operating loss carryforward (Compustat TLCF) divided by 
lagged assets (Compustat AT). 
MTB Lagged market-to-book ratio (Compustat PRCC_F * CSHO)/CEQ). 
CASH Cash holdings (CH) scaled by lagged total assets (AT). 
LEV Leverage, computed as total long-term debt (Compustat DLTT) divided 
by lagged total assets (Compustat AT). 
%ΔREV The difference between current-year sales (SALE) and 
prior-year sales, divided by prior-year sales. 
R&D Research and development activity, computed by scaling R&D expense 
(Compustat XRD) by lagged total assets (Compustat AT). 
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FIGURE 1 
 
The figure illustrates how firms’ future cash effective tax rates change after the IRS increases their 
download of the firms’ 10-Ks. High (low) IRS attention firms are those with above (below) median 
of the number of 10-K downloads by the IRS in fiscal year 2010 which we consider the treatment 
year. We ensure that high IRS attention firms are low IRS attention firms in periods 2007, 2008, 
and 2009 and the low IRS attention firms are classified as such throughout periods 2007 to 2013. 
We then plot CETRs for the high and low IRS attention firms over years 2007 to 2013. 
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TABLE 1  
Sample Selection  
Sample Selection Process  
All firm-year observations from Compustat  123,301 
Less:  
Foreign firms (32,761) 
Financials and utilities (18,468) 
Less than or equal to $0 in total assets (19,086) 
Missing variables (34,016) 
Merge with IRS attention data from Bonzanic et al. 
2017 
(62) 
Restrict sample period from 2007 to 2014 (6462) 
Final sample  12,446  
This table reports the sample selection process for the full sample. 
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TABLE 2  
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean St. Dev P25 Median P75 
GAAPETR 12,446 0.288 0.128 0.216 0.312 0.368 
CASHETR 12,446 0.235 0.159 0.109 0.233 0.333 
IRSATTENTION 12,446 9.450 23.294 1.000 3.000 8.000 
BTD 12,446 0.037 0.109 0.000 0.024 0.059 
UTB 12,446 0.008 0.013 0.000 0.003 0.010 
DTA 12,446 0.053 0.047 0.023 0.042 0.071 
DTL 12,446 0.055 0.055 0.014 0.040 0.077 
SIZE 12,446 6.633 2.148 5.311 6.752 8.036 
MTB 12,446 2.935 3.618 1.307 2.106 3.499 
MNE 12,446 0.590 0.492 0.000 1.000 1.000 
LEV 12,446 0.193 0.221 0.000 0.135 0.297 
R&D 12,446 0.028 0.052 0.000 0.000 0.032 
INVT 12,446 0.129 0.142 0.009 0.088 0.195 
CAPITAL 12,446 0.274 0.258 0.086 0.187 0.377 
ROA 12,446 0.107 0.085 0.051 0.089 0.142 
ΔNOL 12,446 0.000 0.080 -0.001 0.000 0.001 
CASH 12,446 0.155 0.168 0.038 0.101 0.209 
%ΔREV 12,446 0.126 0.253 0.004 0.078 0.184 
INTAN  12,446 0.227 0.238 0.026 0.153 0.361 
This table reports firm characteristics of the full sample from the year 2007 to the year 2014. To mitigate 
the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. All 
variables are defined in the appendix A.  
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TABLE 3 
Replicating Bozanic et al. 2017 
Dependent Variable = IRSATTENTION 
CASHETR  
 
0.002 
(0.683) 
0.000 
(0.058) 
–0.005 
(–1.146) 
–0.006 
(–1.247) 
GAAPETR  
 
–0.017*** 
(–4.528) 
–0.016*** 
(–4.407) 
–0.002 
(–0.516) 
–0.002 
(–0.465) 
BTD 
 
 
0.010** 
(2.461) 
0.010** 
(2.558) 
0.002 
(0.462) 
0.002 
(0.443) 
UTB 
 
 
0.035*** 
(8.169) 
0.036*** 
(8.697) 
0.025*** 
(3.800) 
0.024*** 
(3.746) 
DTA 
 
 
0.006 
(1.457) 
0.011*** 
(2.789) 
0.003 
(0.401) 
0.003 
(0.390) 
DTL 
 
 
0.013*** 
(2.690) 
0.011** 
(2.364) 
0.009 
(0.977) 
0.009 
(0.949) 
SIZE 
 
 
0.227*** 
(28.738) 
0.218*** 
(27.270) 
0.056*** 
(2.666) 
0.056*** 
(2.616) 
MTB 
 
 
–0.007** 
(–2.390) 
–0.007** 
(–2.444) 
–0.007* 
(–1.895) 
–0.007* 
(–1.815) 
MNE 
 
 
0.036 
(1.515) 
0.042* 
(1.679) 
0.000 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.095) 
LEV 
 
 
–0.092 
(–1.596) 
–0.089 
(–1.547) 
0.002 
(0.017) 
0.017 
(0.172) 
R&D 
 
 
–0.866*** 
(–3.695) 
–0.726*** 
(–2.916) 
0.154 
(0.202) 
0.076 
(0.099) 
INVT 
 
 
0.272*** 
(3.432) 
0.078 
(0.814) 
–0.312 
(–1.322) 
–0.278 
(–1.168) 
CAPITAL 
 
 
–0.368*** 
(–6.254) 
–0.346*** 
(–5.506) 
–0.293** 
(–2.318) 
–0.294** 
(–2.264) 
ROA 
 
 
–0.616*** 
(–4.577) 
–0.552*** 
(–4.192) 
0.096 
(0.451) 
0.063 
(0.297) 
ΔNOL 
 
 
–0.213* 
(–1.929) 
–0.196* 
(–1.783) 
0.147 
(0.990) 
0.149 
(0.998) 
CASH 
 
 
–0.260*** 
(–4.106) 
–0.197*** 
(–3.074) 
–0.046 
(–0.452) 
–0.038 
(–0.364) 
%ΔREV 
 
 
–0.085** 
(–2.343) 
–0.105*** 
(–2.922) 
–0.037 
(–0.739) 
–0.038 
(–0.756) 
INTAN  
 
 
–0.300*** 
(–4.900) 
–0.233*** 
(–3.758) 
–0.040 
(–0.366) 
–0.059 
(–0.534) 
Constant 1.997*** 
(92.241) 
–0.664*** 
(–11.770) 
–0.531*** 
(–3.400) 
1.767*** 
(10.031) 
–0.286** 
(–2.459) 
Ind., Firm, Year FE NO NO YES NO YES 
Cluster by  FIRM FIRM FIRM FIRM FIRM 
Observations 12446 12446 12446 12446 12446 
R2 0.650 0.387 0.404 0.652 0.654 
This table reports the results replicating the results in table 2 of Bozanic et al. 2017. All p-values are 
two-tailed.  ***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. All variables 
are defined in the appendix A.  
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TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistics  
Variable N Mean St. Dev P25 Median P75 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Firms with PROFIT1 = 1 
GAAPETR 9,297 0.299 0.110 0.244 0.320 0.368 
CASHETR 9,297 0.254 0.146 0.154 0.255 0.343 
IRSATTENTION 9,297 10.493 25.049 1.000 3.000 9.000 
BTD 9,297 0.037 0.085 0.003 0.025 0.056 
UTB 9,297 0.008 0.013 0.000 0.003 0.010 
DTA 9,297 0.052 0.042 0.025 0.043 0.068 
DTL 9,297 0.057 0.054 0.018 0.043 0.079 
SIZE 9,297 6.959 2.066 5.715 7.040 8.296 
MTB 9,297 3.017 3.335 1.404 2.210 3.599 
MNE 9,297 0.614 0.487 0.000 1.000 1.000 
LEV 9,297 0.188 0.212 0.001 0.138 0.289 
R&D 9,297 0.025 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.029 
INVT 9,297 0.132 0.141 0.011 0.095 0.198 
CAPITAL 9,297 0.274 0.248 0.094 0.193 0.371 
ROA 9,297 0.117 0.080 0.061 0.098 0.150 
ΔNOL 9,297 0.001 0.060 –0.001 0.000 0.000 
CASH 9,297 0.148 0.157 0.039 0.098 0.203 
%ΔREV 9,297 0.103 0.202 0.005 0.073 0.165 
INTAN 9,297 0.235 0.237 0.033 0.168 0.374 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Firms with PROFIT1 = 0 
GAAPETR 3,149 0.255 0.167 0.110 0.269 0.369 
CASHETR 3,149 0.179 0.179 0.029 0.126 0.280 
IRSATTENTION 3,149 6.373 16.721 1.000 2.000 5.000 
BTD 3,149 0.039 0.161 –0.018 0.021 0.070 
UTB 3,149 0.008 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.009 
DTA 3,149 0.057 0.057 0.013 0.042 0.081 
DTL 3,149 0.049 0.058 0.004 0.029 0.072 
SIZE 3,149 5.670 2.097 4.189 5.832 7.136 
MTB 3,149 3.062 3.695 1.151 1.882 3.253 
MNE 3,149 0.518 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
LEV 3,149 0.207 0.247 0.000 0.125 0.327 
R&D 3,149 0.038 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.047 
INVT 3,149 0.122 0.147 0.003 0.073 0.186 
CAPITAL 3,149 0.273 0.284 0.065 0.162 0.399 
ROA 3,149 0.078 0.093 0.023 0.058 0.107 
ΔNOL 3,149 –0.004 0.122 –0.012 0.000 0.003 
CASH 3,149 0.175 0.196 0.036 0.110 0.235 
%ΔREV 3,149 0.193 0.355 0.000 0.102 0.263 
INTAN  3,149 0.202 0.239 0.012 0.111 0.317 
This table reports firm characteristics for the samples with PROFIT1 = 1 (Panel A) and PROFIT1 = 0 (Panel B) 
over 2007 to 2014.  PROFIT1 equals one, if pre-tax income in the recent two years is greater than zero, zero 
otherwise. To mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent 
levels. All variables are defined in appendix A. 
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TABLE 5 
Pearson (above) / Spearman (below) Correlations 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
IRSATTENTION  0.012 -0.129 0.061 0.361 0.141 0.153 0.485 0.077 0.252 0.060 0.002 -0.033 -0.055 -0.038 0.043 -0.085 -0.110 0.077 
  0.266 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.824 0.002 <.0001 0.000 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
CASHETR 0.012  0.360 -0.355 0.020 -0.019 -0.023 0.030 0.007 -0.005 -0.144 -0.156 0.164 -0.137 0.153 0.054 -0.053 -0.163 -0.028 
 0.266  <.0001 <.0001 0.051 0.073 0.026 0.004 0.504 0.616 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.007 
GAAPETR -0.129 0.360  -0.230 -0.141 0.002 0.137 -0.111 -0.007 -0.237 -0.069 -0.222 0.071 0.058 0.152 -0.010 -0.062 -0.025 -0.080 
 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 0.874 <.0001 <.0001 0.500 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.360 <.0001 0.018 <.0001 
BTD 0.061 -0.355 -0.230  0.017 -0.045 0.069 0.092 0.052 0.027 0.072 0.038 -0.104 0.152 0.232 0.386 0.057 0.138 -0.003 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  0.104 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.008 <.0001 0.000 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.767 
UTB 0.361 0.020 -0.141 0.017  0.302 0.123 0.467 0.099 0.393 0.068 0.152 -0.066 -0.162 -0.027 0.056 -0.003 -0.109 0.169 
 <.0001 0.051 <.0001 0.104  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.008 <.0001 0.776 <.0001 <.0001 
DTA 0.141 -0.019 0.002 -0.045 0.302  0.159 0.215 0.136 0.182 0.067 0.142 -0.032 -0.069 -0.015 0.041 -0.020 -0.073 0.052 
 <.0001 0.073 0.874 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.002 <.0001 0.158 <.0001 0.054 <.0001 <.0001 
DTL 0.153 -0.023 0.137 0.069 0.123 0.159  0.300 0.018 0.024 0.337 -0.244 -0.172 0.330 -0.155 0.080 -0.335 -0.002 0.324 
 <.0001 0.026 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 0.085 0.023 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.869 <.0001 
SIZE 0.485 0.030 -0.111 0.092 0.467 0.215 0.300  0.237 0.379 0.180 0.029 -0.167 0.057 0.076 0.068 -0.157 -0.040 0.188 
 <.0001 0.004 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.005 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.000 <.0001 
MTB 0.077 0.007 -0.007 0.052 0.099 0.136 0.018 0.237  0.057 0.034 0.111 -0.090 -0.036 0.284 -0.003 0.112 0.072 0.007 
 <.0001 0.504 0.500 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.085 <.0001  <.0001 0.001 <.0001 <.0001 0.001 <.0001 0.737 <.0001 <.0001 0.518 
MNE 0.252 -0.005 -0.237 0.027 0.393 0.182 0.024 0.379 0.057  0.003 0.202 -0.030 -0.199 -0.075 0.048 0.002 -0.061 0.161 
 <.0001 0.616 <.0001 0.008 <.0001 <.0001 0.023 <.0001 <.0001  0.762 <.0001 0.004 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.829 <.0001 <.0001 
LEV 0.060 -0.144 -0.069 0.072 0.068 0.067 0.337 0.180 0.034 0.003  -0.189 -0.098 0.291 -0.224 0.074 -0.279 0.100 0.338 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.001 0.762  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
R&D 0.002 -0.156 -0.222 0.038 0.152 0.142 -0.244 0.029 0.111 0.202 -0.189  -0.102 -0.272 0.049 -0.024 0.322 0.055 0.005 
 0.824 <.0001 <.0001 0.000 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.005 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.023 <.0001 <.0001 0.601 
INVT -0.033 0.164 0.071 -0.104 -0.066 -0.032 -0.172 -0.167 -0.090 -0.030 -0.098 -0.102  -0.117 0.010 0.002 -0.127 0.021 -0.229 
 0.002 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.002 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.004 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 0.331 0.867 <.0001 0.043 <.0001 
CAPITAL -0.055 -0.137 0.058 0.152 -0.162 -0.069 0.330 0.057 -0.036 -0.199 0.291 -0.272 -0.117  -0.071 0.059 -0.241 0.133 -0.327 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
ROA -0.038 0.153 0.152 0.232 -0.027 -0.015 -0.155 0.076 0.284 -0.075 -0.224 0.049 0.010 -0.071  -0.071 0.290 0.153 -0.181 
 0.000 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.008 0.158 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.331 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
ΔNOL 0.043 0.054 -0.010 0.386 0.056 0.041 0.080 0.068 -0.003 0.048 0.074 -0.024 0.002 0.059 -0.071  -0.062 0.035 0.065 
 <.0001 <.0001 0.360 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.737 <.0001 <.0001 0.023 0.867 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 0.001 <.0001 
CASH -0.085 -0.053 -0.062 0.057 -0.003 -0.020 -0.335 -0.157 0.112 0.002 -0.279 0.322 -0.127 -0.241 0.290 -0.062 1.000 0.131 -0.180 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.776 0.054 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.829 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 
%ΔREV -0.110 -0.163 -0.025 0.138 -0.109 -0.073 -0.002 -0.040 0.072 -0.061 0.100 0.055 0.021 0.133 0.153 0.035 0.131 1.000 0.131 
 <.0001 <.0001 0.018 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.869 0.000 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.043 <.0001 <.0001 0.001 <.0001  <.0001 
INTAN 0.077 -0.028 -0.080 -0.003 0.169 0.052 0.324 0.188 0.007 0.161 0.338 0.005 -0.229 -0.327 -0.181 0.065 -0.180 0.131 1.000 
  <.0001 0.007 <.0001 0.767 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.518 <.0001 <.0001 0.601 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  
 This table reports Person and Spearman Correlation results between variables in the sample with PROFIT1=1. Reported P-values are two-sided. 
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This table reports the effect of CASHETR on IRS attention conditional on firm profits in the recent two and three 
years. PROFIT1 (PROFIT2) equals one, if pre-tax income in the recent two (three) years is greater than zero, zero 
otherwise.  All p-values are two-tailed.  ***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
All variables are defined in the appendix A. All standard errors are clustered by firm. 
TABLE 6 
IRS Attention, Cash Tax Avoidance, and Firm Profitability (H1) 
 PROFIT1=1 PROFIT1=0 PROFIT2=1 PROFIT2=0 
Dependent Variable = IRSATTENTION IRSATTENTION IRSATTENTION IRSATTENTION 
CASHETR –0.010* 
(–1.658) 
–0.002 
(–0.093) 
–0.014** 
(–2.089) 
0.001 
(0.064) 
GAAPETR –0.010 
(–1.575) 
0.012 
(0.662) 
–0.010 
(–1.216) 
0.003 
(0.379) 
BTD 
0.002 
(0.363) 
–0.003 
(–0.124) 
–0.001 
(–0.195) 
0.003 
(0.317) 
UTB 
0.021*** 
(2.672) 
0.028 
(0.909) 
0.016* 
(1.783) 
0.016 
(0.971) 
DTA 
0.003 
(0.334) 
0.009 
(0.352) 
0.003 
(0.256) 
0.006 
(0.412) 
DTL 
0.012 
(1.066) 
–0.004 
(–0.106) 
0.008 
(0.599) 
0.004 
(0.238) 
SIZE 
0.086*** 
(2.870) 
–0.040 
(–0.457) 
0.089** 
(2.408) 
–0.019 
(–0.456) 
MTB 
–0.007 
(–1.517) 
–0.001 
(–0.065) 
–0.010 
(–1.599) 
–0.005 
(–0.677) 
MNE 
–0.005 
(–0.079) 
0.029 
(0.115) 
–0.003 
(–0.035) 
0.036 
(0.263) 
LEV 
0.096 
(0.729) 
–0.136 
(–0.320) 
0.155 
(0.999) 
–0.126 
(–0.629) 
R&D 
0.335 
(0.273) 
–0.456 
(–0.233) 
–0.770 
(–0.478) 
0.174 
(0.152) 
INVT 
–0.512 
(–1.629) 
0.027 
(0.023) 
–0.435 
(–1.165) 
0.053 
(0.113) 
CAPITAL 
–0.417** 
(–2.440) 
0.126 
(0.184) 
–0.473** 
(–2.369) 
0.004 
(0.017) 
ROA 
0.186 
(0.659) 
0.109 
(0.119) 
0.265 
(0.806) 
0.095 
(0.208) 
ΔNOL 
0.250 
(1.030) 
0.177 
(0.366) 
0.519 
(1.607) 
0.077 
(0.318) 
CASH 
–0.052 
(–0.369) 
–0.022 
(–0.058) 
–0.076 
(–0.431) 
0.007 
(0.040) 
%ΔREV 
–0.058 
(–0.821) 
–0.116 
(–0.593) 
–0.035 
(–0.400) 
–0.090 
(–1.013) 
INTAN  
–0.030 
(–0.212) 
–0.159 
(–0.370) 
–0.051 
(–0.317) 
–0.094 
(–0.443) 
Constant –0.212 
(–1.479) 
–0.198 
(–0.309) 
–0.070 
(–0.451) 
–0.217 
(–0.823) 
Ind., Firm, Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Dif. on 𝜷𝟏 (Test of H1) t=–2.355 t=–5.095 
Observations 9,297 3,149 7,573 4,873 
R2 0.662 0.864 0.666 0.755 
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TABLE 7 
IRS Attention, Cash Tax Avoidance, and Firm Size (H2) 
 PROFIT1=1 PROFIT2=1 
 BIGFIRM=1 BIGFIRM=0 BIGFIRM=1 BIGFIRM=0 
Dependent Variable = IRSATTENTION IRSATTENTION IRSATTENTION IRSATTENTION 
CASHETR –0.017 
(–1.542)  
–0.002 
(–0.349) 
–0.018 
(–1.514) 
–0.006 
(–0.693) 
GAAPETR –0.014 
(–1.102) 
–0.011 
(–1.347)  
–0.019 
(–1.319) 
–0.007 
(–0.687) 
BTD 
–0.001 
(–0.146) 
0.007 
(0.818) 
–0.002 
(–0.156) 
0.004 
(0.411) 
UTB 
0.021* 
(1.938) 
0.020 
(1.559) 
0.015 
(1.229) 
0.016 
(1.150) 
DTA 
–0.006 
(–0.384) 
0.011 
(0.883) 
–0.021 
(–1.137) 
0.018 
(1.145) 
DTL 
0.027 
(1.328) 
–0.008 
(–0.603) 
0.031 
(1.383) 
–0.011 
(–0.745) 
MTB 
–0.009 
(–1.500) 
–0.004 
(–0.353) 
–0.011 
(–1.528) 
0.004 
(0.367) 
MNE 
–0.099 
(–0.854) 
0.086 
(0.963) 
–0.014 
(–0.114) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
LEV 
0.074 
(0.336) 
0.171 
(1.016) 
0.168 
(0.652) 
0.279 
(1.527) 
R&D 
0.051 
(0.027) 
–0.548 
(–0.296) 
–1.147 
(–0.511) 
–1.009 
(–0.415) 
INVT 
–0.679 
(–1.023) 
–0.410 
(–1.135) 
–0.547 
(–0.704) 
–0.290 
(–0.664) 
CAPITAL 
–0.431 
(–1.452) 
–0.324 
(–1.467) 
–0.335 
(–1.052) 
–0.434 
(–1.602) 
ROA 
0.284 
(0.562) 
0.154 
(0.433) 
0.635 
(1.150) 
0.114 
(0.272) 
ΔNOL 
0.926** 
(1.988) 
0.040 
(0.142) 
1.141** 
(2.046) 
0.193 
(0.490) 
CASH 
0.084 
(0.313) 
–0.053 
(–0.317) 
0.281 
(0.975) 
–0.139 
(–0.598) 
%ΔREV 
–0.169 
(–1.472) 
0.003 
(0.031) 
–0.103 
(–0.771) 
–0.056 
(–0.465) 
INTAN  
–0.076 
(–0.322) 
0.051 
(0.266) 
–0.180 
(–0.709) 
–0.036 
(–0.170) 
Constant 1.893*** 
(7.648) 
–0.175 
(–1.117) 
1.953*** 
(7.074) 
0.022 
(0.125) 
Ind., Firm, Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Dif. on 𝜷𝟏 (Test of H2) t=–4.990 t=–3.691 
Observations 4,648 4,649 3,787 3,786 
R2 0.612 0.651 0.653 0.620 
This table reports the effect of CASHETR on IRS attention conditional on firm size.  PROFIT1 (PROFIT2) equals 
one, if pre-tax income in the recent two (three) years is greater than zero, zero otherwise.  BIGFIRM equals one, if 
the market value of equity is greater than the sample median, zero otherwise. All p-values are two-tailed.  ***, ** 
and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. All variables are defined in the appendix A.  
All standard errors are clustered by firm. 
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TABLE 8   
IRS Attention, Cash Tax Avoidance, and Foreign Operations (H3) 
 PROFIT1=1 PROFIT2=1 
 MNE=1 MNE=0 MNE=1 MNE=0 
Dependent Variable = IRSATTENTION IRSATTENTION IRSATTENTION IRSATTENTION 
CASHETR –0.016* 
(–1.952) 
–0.006 
(–0.733) 
–0.014** 
(–2.089) 
0.001 
(0.064) 
GAAPETR –0.011 
(–1.206) 
–0.002 
(–0.160) 
–0.010 
(–1.216) 
0.003 
(0.379) 
BTD 
0.008 
(0.936) 
–0.004 
(–0.414) 
–0.001 
(–0.195) 
0.003 
(0.317) 
UTB 
0.022** 
(2.250) 
0.012 
(0.806) 
0.016* 
(1.783) 
0.016 
(0.971) 
DTA 
0.004 
(0.256) 
0.004 
(0.280) 
0.003 
(0.256) 
0.006 
(0.412) 
DTL 
0.022 
(1.283) 
–0.005 
(–0.291) 
0.008 
(0.599) 
0.004 
(0.238) 
SIZE 
0.124*** 
(2.805) 
0.030 
(0.744) 
0.089** 
(2.408) 
–0.019 
(–0.456) 
MTB 
–0.010 
(–1.547) 
–0.008 
(–0.844) 
–0.010 
(–1.599) 
–0.005 
(–0.677) 
LEV 
0.114 
(0.618) 
0.029 
(0.142) 
0.155 
(0.999) 
–0.126 
(–0.629) 
R&D 
0.349 
(0.194) 
0.955 
(0.688) 
–0.770 
(–0.478) 
0.174 
(0.152) 
INVT 
–0.228 
(–0.475) 
–0.708 
(–1.536) 
–0.435 
(–1.165) 
0.053 
(0.113) 
CAPITAL 
–0.686** 
(–2.468) 
–0.113 
(–0.496) 
–0.473** 
(–2.369) 
0.004 
(0.017) 
ROA 
–0.146 
(–0.339) 
0.537 
(1.381) 
0.265 
(0.806) 
0.095 
(0.208) 
ΔNOL 
0.274 
(0.834) 
0.319 
(0.945) 
0.519 
(1.607) 
0.077 
(0.318) 
CASH 
–0.097 
(–0.426) 
0.080 
(0.442) 
–0.076 
(–0.431) 
0.007 
(0.040) 
%ΔREV 
–0.007 
(–0.066) 
–0.099 
(–1.020) 
–0.035 
(–0.400) 
–0.090 
(–1.013) 
INTAN  
–0.137 
(–0.664) 
0.199 
(0.944) 
–0.051 
(–0.317) 
–0.094 
(–0.443) 
Constant –0.318* 
(–1.675) 
–0.442* 
(–1.677) 
–0.070 
(–0.451) 
–0.217 
(–0.823) 
Ind., Firm, Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Dif. on 𝜷𝟏 (Test of H3) t=–3.101 t=–4.312 
Observations 5,707 3,590 4,760 2,813 
R2 0.661 0.629 0.665 0.634 
This table reports the effect of CASHETR on IRS attention conditional on foreign operations.  PROFIT1 (PROFIT2) 
equals one, if pre-tax income in the recent two (three) years is greater than zero, zero otherwise.   MNE equals one, 
if firms have any foreign pre-tax income, zero otherwise. All p-values are two-tailed.  ***, ** and * denote 
significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. All variables are defined in the appendix A. All standard 
errors are clustered by firm. 
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TABLE 9 
Future Cash Tax Payment, IRS Attention and Firm Profitability 
 FULLSAMPLE  PROFIT1=1 PROFIT1=0 PROFIT2=1 PROFIT2=0 
 CASHETRt+1  CASHETRt+1 CASHETRt+1 CASHETRt+1 CASHETRt+1 
IRSATTENTIONHAT 0.010**  0.005 –0.058 0.016 –0.054* 
GAAPETR 0.002**  0.010*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 
BTD –0.009***  –0.018*** –0.016*** –0.018*** –0.016*** 
UTB –0.002  –0.001 0.005* –0.002 0.005** 
DTA –0.007***  –0.004*** –0.005*** –0.004*** –0.005*** 
DTL 0.000  0.001 0.008*** 0.000 0.007*** 
SIZE 0.011*  0.000 0.017** –0.003 0.016*** 
MTB –0.002**  –0.002*** –0.004*** –0.002*** –0.004*** 
MNE 0.001  0.020*** 0.024** 0.017*** 0.026*** 
LEV –0.004  –0.028** –0.057*** –0.028** –0.044** 
R&D –0.493*  –0.255*** –0.413*** –0.220*** –0.386*** 
INVT 0.074  0.126*** 0.142*** 0.118*** 0.148*** 
CAPITAL 0.040  –0.028* –0.040 –0.028* –0.033 
ROA 0.310***  0.400*** 0.409*** 0.385*** 0.421*** 
ΔNOL 0.192***  0.427*** 0.317*** 0.485*** 0.313*** 
CASH 0.047**  0.013 0.039 0.015 0.027 
%ΔREV –0.007  –0.041*** –0.009 –0.036*** –0.022 
INTAN  0.047**  0.005 0.018 0.005 0.018 
Constant –0.084***  0.207*** 0.081 0.242*** 0.073 
Ind. & Firm FE YES  YES YES YES YES 
Cluster by  FIRM  FIRM FIRM FIRM FIRM 
Observations 8,279  6,614  1,665 5,537  2,742 
Dif. on    t=15.429 t=20.696 
R2 0.623  0.264 0.277 0.264 0.268 
This table reports the effect of IRS attention on future CASHETR in the full sample and samples conditional on profitability. PROFIT1 (PROFIT2) equals one, 
if pre-tax income in the recent two (three) years is greater than zero, zero otherwise. ***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
All variables are defined in the appendix A. All standard errors are clustered by firm. 
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TABLE 10 
Future Cash Tax Payment, IRS Attention, Firm Size, and Foreign Operations 
 PROFIT1=1  PROFIT2=1 
 BIGFIRM =1 BIGFIRM =0  MNE=1 MNE=0 
 CASHETRt+1 CASHETRt+1  CASHETRt+1 CASHETRt+1 
IRSATTENTIONHAT 0.038 –0.020  0.009 0.009 
GAAPETR 0.003 0.002  0.004 –0.001 
BTD –0.007*** –0.009***  –0.008*** –0.009*** 
UTB –0.004* 0.001  –0.003 –0.002 
DTA –0.007** –0.006*  –0.007*** –0.005 
DTL –0.000 0.001  0.000 0.001 
SIZE    0.009 –0.005 
MTB –0.001 –0.003  –0.001 –0.003* 
MNE 0.006 0.014    
LEV 0.004 –0.024  0.006 0.012 
R&D –0.361 –0.242  –0.437 –0.112 
INVT 0.142 0.092  0.060 0.178 
CAPITAL 0.125* –0.060  0.011 –0.016 
ROA 0.356*** 0.375***  0.344*** 0.416*** 
ΔNOL 0.067 0.286***  0.165** 0.381*** 
CASH 0.014 0.048  0.048 0.077* 
%ΔREV –0.007 –0.026  –0.017 –0.025 
INTAN  0.069 0.033  0.047 0.045 
Constant 0.151 0.059  0.141*** 0.040 
Ind. & Firm FE YES YES  YES YES 
Cluster by  FIRM FIRM  FIRM FIRM 
Observations 2,876 2,661  3,543 1,994 
Dif. on  t=5.003  t=0.000 
R2 0.640 0.610  0.594 0.632 
This table reports the effect of IRS attention on future CASHETR conditional on size and overseas operations. 
PROFIT1 (PROFIT2) equals one, if pre-tax income in the recent two (three) years is greater than zero. BIGFIRM 
equals one, if the market value of equity is greater than the sample median, zero otherwise. MNE equals one, if 
firms have any foreign pre-tax income, zero otherwise. ***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 
10%, respectively. All variables are defined in the appendix A. All standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 
 
